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From	  Polemo	  and	  Crates	  to	  Arcesilaus:	  Revolution	  or	  Natural	  Transition?	  	  It	   is	   convenient	   for	   the	   teaching	   of	   ancient	   philosophy	   that	   the	   Old	   Academy	  should	   terminate	   with	   Crates,	   and	   that	   a	   new	   Hellenistic	   phase	   should	   be	  ushered	   in	   by	   Arcesilaus’	   revolutionary	   introduction	   of	   a	   distinctly	   Academic	  brand	   of	   ‘Scepticism’.	   It	   helps	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   early	   precursors	   of	  Pyrrhonist	  Scepticism,	  i.e.	  Pyrrho	  himself	  and	  Timon,	  and	  the	  Pyrrhonist	  revival	  of	   Aenesidemus.	   And	   it	   supplies	   an	   ‘-­‐ism’	   to	   suit	   our	   modern	   demand	   for	  philosophic	   labels.	   It	   also	   gives	   colour	   and	   controversy	   to	   the	   increasingly	  pedestrian	   history	   of	   Plato’s	   school,	   something	   to	   which	   students	   will	   readily	  respond.	  It	  is	  convenient,	  but	  is	  it	  right?	  Clearly	  there	  were	  changes	  in	  the	  public	  face	  of	  the	  newly	  invigorated	  Academy,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  deny	  the	  credit	  for	  those	   changes	   to	  Arcesilaus.	  After	   all,	   Speusippus,	  Xenocrates,	   and	  Polemo	  had	  all	   stamped	   their	   own	   personalities	   on	   the	   Academy	   during	   the	   time	   of	   their	  leadership,	   but	   nobody	   had	   seen	   this	   as	   in	   any	  way	   illegitimate.	   The	   question	  that	  concerns	  me	  is	  whether	  such	  changes	  amounted	  to	  stasis.	  	  	  The	   notion	   of	   a	   revolution	  within	   the	   school	  was	   developed	   by	  Antiochus	   and	  given	   its	  most	   eloquent	   extant	   expression	  by	  Numenius,	  who	  wrote	  a	  work	  on	  the	  Academic	  diastasis	   from	  Plato	  (frr.	  24-­‐28	  des	  Places).	  What	  we	  have	  of	   this	  satirical	  piece	  is	  well	  worth	  reading,	  but	  it	  is	  based	  on	  the	  unhistorical	  notion	  of	  the	   fading	   of	   an	   ancient	   vision:	   the	   vision	   of	   Pythagoras,	   which	   Plato	   had	  somewhat	   ambiguously	   preserved	   for	   posterity,	   which	   the	   Old	   Academy	   had	  more	  or	  less	  clung	  to,	  and	  which	  Arcesilaus	  abandoned	  in	  favour	  of	  his	  sceptical	  strategies.	   Though	  Xenocrates	   and	  Speusippus	  were	   certainly	   interested	   in	   the	  connections	   between	   their	   own	  Academic	   heritage	   and	   the	   Pythagoreans,	   they	  surely	   saw	   their	  work	  as	  being	   that	   of	   building	  upon	  Platonic	   foundations	   and	  further	  advancing	  Platonic	  researches.	  The	   truth	  was	  not	  something	   that	   lay	   in	  the	  past,	  but	  something	  expected	  to	  emerge	  with	  greater	  clarity	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  Antiochus	  of	  Ascalon,	  known	  to	  us	  primarily	  through	  the	  philosophical	  works	  of	  Cicero,	  was	  not	  constrained	  by	  the	  same	  notions	  of	  ancient	  wisdom,	  but	  regularly	  drew	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   Old	   Academy	   and	   the	   New,	   implying	   that	  
Arcesilaus’	  innovations	  were	  so	  fundamental	  that	  with	  him	  the	  Academy	  ceased	  to	   be	   the	   school	   that	   it	   had	   once	   been.	   It	   was	   this	   claim	   that	   caused	   Philo	   of	  Larissa,	   then	   the	   Scholarch,	   to	  write	   his	   ‘Roman	  Books’	   in	  which	   the	   notion	   of	  two	  Academies	  was	  attacked.	  The	  thesis	  is	  most	  simply	  put	  at	  Academica	  1.13	  (=	  TXXX),1	  from	  which	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Philo’s	  thesis	  responds	  to	  another	  claim	  that	  is	  already	   public,	   a	   claim	   that	   the	  Academy	  had,	   since	  Arcesilaus,	   abandoned	   the	  heritage	   of	   Plato.	   Claims	   of	   abandoned	   heritage	   always	   shock	   the	   leaders	   of	  established	   organizations,	   and	   it	   falls	   upon	   the	   official	   leader	   to	   respond.	  Antiochus’	   response	   to	   Philo’s	   response	   was	   also	   one	   of	   shock	   (Acad.	   2.11	   =	  T.XXIX).	  Philo’s	  thesis	  was	  more	  radical	   than	  anything	  that	  Antiochus	  was	  used	  to	  hearing,	  even	  though	  few	  Academics	  could	  have	  willingly	  admitted	  that	  their	  school	  had	  ever	  abrogated	  its	  former	  heritage.	  	  
Academic	  Continuity	  and	  Philo	  of	  Larissa	  That	  the	  school	  had	  some	  on-­‐going	  mission,	  continuing	  from	  Plato	  down	  to	  Philo,	  is	  argued	  without	  obvious	  signs	  that	  the	  view	  is	  contentious,	  by	  Cicero	  at	  Ac.	  2.7-­‐9.	  These	  chapters	  detail	  no	  on-­‐going	  school	  doctrine,	   for	   that	  would	  have	  been	  unthinkable	   for	   an	   orthodox	   Academic,	   but	   emphasize	   rather	   the	   intellectual	  freedom	  of	   the	  Academic	   tradition,	  a	   freedom	  that	  demands	  no	  adherence	   to	  a	  list	  of	   teachings.	  The	  validity	  of	  differences	  of	  opinion	   is	   forcefully	  maintained,	  the	   power	   of	   reason	   to	   guide	   is	  welcomed,	   and	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   get	   either	   to	   the	  hidden	  truth	  or	  somewhere	  close	  to	  it.	  The	  unity	  of	  the	  Academy	  is	  depicted	  as	  a	  unity	  of	  culture,	  which	  separates	  it	  from	  those	  schools	  whose	  rationale	  is	  rather	  the	  adherence	  to	  a	  set	  of	  doctrines.	  	  	  This	  version	  of	  a	  One-­‐Academy	  thesis	   is	  broadly	  correct.	  Speusippus	   felt	  under	  no	   obligation	   to	   adhere	   to	   doctrines	   bequeathed	   by	   Plato,	   differing	   sharply	   in	  both	   ethics	   and	   metaphysics.	   Nobody	   else	   felt	   an	   obligation	   to	   reproduce	   the	  system	   of	   Speusippus,	   and	   Xenocrates	   had	   doctrines	   of	   his	   own:	   though	  Xenocrates	   frequently	   resorted	   to	   the	   kind	   of	  mythical	   imagery	   that	   tended	   to	  veil	  anything	  distinctive	  in	  his	  views,	  for	  which	  reason	  he	  became	  a	  favourite	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  I include the references in Brittain’s collection of Testimonia, included as an appendix 
(Brittain 2001). 
Plutarch’s.	   Though	   Antiochus	   promoted	   the	   early	   successors,	   particularly	  Polemo,	  Numenius	   (fr.	   24.6-­‐12)	  will	   only	   admit	   that	   the	  basic	   character	   of	   the	  teaching	  remained	  broadly	  the	  same	  (ajei; to; h\qo" dieteivneto tw'n dogmavtwn scedo;n 
dh; taujtovn),	   insofar	   as	   	   ejpochv and	   associated	   doctrines	   had	   not	   yet	   been	  introduced,	  allowing	  that	  by	  their	  omissions	  and	  distortions	  ‘they	  did	  not	  stick	  to	  their	  initial	  heritage’.	  Numenius	  correctly	  saw	  these	  scholarchs	  failing	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  received	  body	  of	  doctrine,	  but	  he	  was	  wrong	  in	  assuming	  that	  the	  Academy’s	  heritage	  must	  be	  judged	  in	  doctrinal	  terms.	  	  
A	  revived	  Socraticism	  under	  Polemo?	  As	  for	  Arcesilaus,	  he	  had	  for	  many	  years	  been	  prominent	  in	  the	  Academy	  before	  becoming	  scholarch	  somewhat	  unexpectedly,	  and	   there	   is	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	   he	   saw	   himself	   as	   betraying	   his	   legacy.	   While	   he	   is	   sometimes	   seen	   as	  reviving	  the	  Socratic	  side	  of	  Plato,	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  was	  quite	  clearly	  a	  strong	  Socratic	   revival	   under	   Polemo.	   Like	   Socrates,	   Polemo	   made	   little	   lasting	  contribution	   to	   anything	  but	   ethics,	   and	  Socrates	  was	   seen	  as	   the	  archetype	  of	  the	   divinely-­‐inspired	   lover-­‐educator	   upon	  whom	  Polemo,	   Crates,	   and	  probably	  Crantor	  too	  saw	  fit	  to	  model	  themselves.	  Love	  was	  ‘a	  service	  to	  the	  gods	  for	  the	  care	   and	   salvation	   of	   the	   young’,	   according	   to	   an	   influential	   definition	   of	  philosophic	  love	  attributed	  to	  Polemo	  by	  Plutarch.2	  Polemo	  himself	  remembered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  Plut.	  Mor.	  780d;	  see	  Dillon	  (2003),	  165;	  Plutarch	  uses	  of	  the	  imperfect	  tense,	  implying	  that	  it	  was	  a	  regular	  claim	  of	  Polemo,	  though	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Theseus	  and	  Romulus	  Compared	  (1.6)	  he	  used	  the	  same	  formula	  regarding	  Ariadne’s	  heaven-­‐sent	  love	  that	  preserved	  Theseus,	  treating	  it	  simply	  as	  a	  definition	  ‘of	  the	  philosophers’.	  In	  the	  Life	  of	  Alcibiades	  (4)	  he	  uses	  the	  phrase	  without	  attribution	  to	  apply	  to	  Socrates’	  alleged	  love	  of	  Alcibiades,	  possibly	  influenced	  by	  the	  way	  it	  is	  characterised	  in	  the	  Alcibiades	  I.	  This	  concept	  of	  Socrates’	  is	  echoed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Hermeias’	  
Commentary	  on	  the	  Phaedrus	  (1.1-­‐5):	  ‘Socrates	  was	  sent	  down	  into	  generation	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  human	  race	  and	  of	  the	  souls	  of	  young	  persons.	  As	  there	  is	  much	  difference	  between	  souls	  in	  their	  characters	  and	  practices,	  he	  benefits	  each	  differently,	  the	  young	  in	  one	  way,	  sophists	  in	  another,	  stretching	  his	  hands	  out	  to	  all	  and	  exhorting	  them	  to	  practise	  philosophy.’	  While	  the	  key	  term	  swthriva is not used there, it appears later in the context of Socratic love (pp. 9-10), while at the 
same time answering the criticism that Plato here uses argument in utramque partem, not denying this, 
but rather explaining how such use can be directed towards the attainment of truth.	  Pro;" me;n to; 
prw'ton lektevon o{ti ei[wqe Plavtwn tw'n ajntikeimevnwn lovgwn ejxevtasin poiei'sqai pro;" eu{resin (20) kai; 
bavsanon th'" ajlhqeiva": ou{tw" kai; ejn Politeiva/ kata; dikaiosuvnh" kai; uJpe;r dikaiosuvnh": <kai;> ejn 
Sofisth'// peri; tou' o[nto" kai; tou' mh; o[nto": kai; nu'n ou\n kat’ e[rwto" ei\pe pro;" to; o[noma to; tw'n 
pollw'n ajpomacovmeno", deiknu;" o{ti ou|to" oujk e[stin e[rw" ajll’ u{bri" kai; pavqo" ti yuch'": a[llo" gavr 
ejstin oJ wJ" qeo;"  [Erw", pollw'n ajgaqw'n toi'" ajnqrwvpoi" w]n (25) corhgo;" kai; ajnagwgeu;" tw'n yucw'n: 
ajnagkai'on ou\n h\n ejpi; swthriva/ tw'n ajnqrwvpwn ejp’ a[mfw gumnavsai tou;" peri; e[rwto" lovgou", 
ejlevgconto" th;n (p.10) dovxan tw'n pollw'n, dia; to; hJgei'sqai aujtou;" ejp’ a[mfw rJevpein to;n e[rwta. 
the	   help	   and	   care	   that	   Xenocrates	   had	   shown	   when	   rescuing	   him	   from	   his	  dissolute	  youth.	  	  	  Further,	   I	   have	   recently	   been	   examining	   another	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Academy	  under	  Polemo	  may	  have	  been	  reviving	  Socrates.	  A	  group	  of	  doubtful	  dialogues,	  comprising	   Alcibiades	   I,	   Alcibiades	   II,	   Hipparchus,	   Theages,	   and	  Minos	   (though	  probably	   not	   Erastae)3	   shows	   common	   linguistic	   trends	   across	   a	   significant	  portion	   of	   each	  work	   that	   sets	   them	   apart	   from	  most	   unquestionably	   genuine	  material.	  I	  have	  identified	  27	  common	  words,4	  whose	  use	  is	  not	  dependent	  upon	  the	   subject	   matter	   or	   the	  manner	   of	   presentation,	   which	   tend	   to	   discriminate	  between	  these	  works	  and	  genuine	  material.	  This	  vocabulary	  mix	  tends	  not	  to	  be	  found	   in	   every	   part	   of	   the	   work,	   so	   that	   the	   problematic	   dialogues	   may	  incorporate	  some	  genuine	  material,	  may	  be	  written	  in	  a	  register	  that	  minimises	  the	  differences,	  or	  may	  simply	  be	  better	  imitations	  of	  Platonic	  style.	  In	  a	  previous	  publication	  Terry	  Roberts	  and	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  group	  of	  such	  words	  much	  found	  in	  the	   relevant	   dubia	   had	   been	   increasing	   over	   time	   in	   Plato,	   and	   that	   another	  group	  seldom	  found	  in	  the	  dubia	  had	  been	  decreasing	  in	  late	  Plato.5	  Hence	  if	  the	  common	   linguistic	   peculiarities	   are	   attributable	   to	   changing	   language	   within	  Academic	   circles,	   then	   we	   are	   almost	   certainly	   dealing	   with	   post-­‐Platonic	  language.	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  all	  show	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  same	  author,	  and	  I	  cannot	  insist	   that	   all	   were	   written	   under	   the	   same	   scholarch,	   but	   if	   I	   am	   right	   in	  suggesting	   that	   they	   are,	   in	   their	   final	   form	   at	   least,	   post-­‐Platonic,	   then	   they	  testify	   to	   a	   revival	   of	   interest	   in	   the	   Academy	   in	   Socrates,	   Socratic	   search	   for	  definitions,	   the	   educational	   purpose	   of	   Socratic	   love,	   and	   the	   relationship	  between	   philosophy	   and	   power.	   I	   have	   previously	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   easiest	   to	  locate	  such	  a	  revival	  in	  the	  earlier	  years	  of	  Polemo’s	  Academy.6	  Here	  is	  just	  one	  example	   of	   the	   results	   of	   cluster	   analysis,	   in	   which	   the	   Minitab	   program	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  The issue of the Erastae is harder to settle because of its narrative form, which seems to imitate that 
of Charmides and Lysis, making direct comparison with other dubia less reliable; its failure to name 
interlocutors is reminiscent of Hipparchus, Minos, and some of the spuria.  
4  Both T-tests and the identification of the most important variables by factor analysis were employed 
for this purpose. 5	   	  See	  H.	  Tarrant	  and	  T.	  Roberts,	   ‘Appendix 2: Report of the Working Vocabulary of the Doubtful 
Dialogues’, in Marguerite Johnson and Harold Tarrant (eds), Alcibiades and the Socratic Lover-
Educator, London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012, 223-236. 
6  See H. Tarrant, ‘Socratic Synousia?’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 43, 2005, 131-55; also 
‘Piecing Together Polemo’, Mediterranean Archaeology 19/20 (2006/7), 225-232. 
classified	   500-­‐word	   blocks7	   from	   relevant	   dubia	   (with	   Erastae	   included),	  
Apology,	   Charmides,	   Laches,	   and	   Hippias	   Minor,8	   separating	   them	   into	   four	  clusters:9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Table	  1:	  distribution	  of	  500-­‐word	  blocks	  of	  selected	  dialogues	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  The final block of any work may extend to 999 words. 
8  The Hippias Minor behaves in different ways on different tests, and is not assumed to be genuine. 
9  The analysis uses standardised data, 26 common words as variables, and Ward’s method. 
F26	  analysis	  500w	   	   	   	   	  
Dialogue	   no.	  blocks	   clus1	   clus3	   clus2	   clus4	  
Alc1	   20	   5	   2	   12	   1	  
Alc2	   8	   3	   0	   1	   4	  
Hprch	   4	   3	   0	   0	   1	  
Erast	   4	   3	   0	   0	   0	  
Theag	   6	   1	   3	   2	   0	  
Minos	   5	   3	   1	   1	   0	  
Apol	   17	   14	   3	   0	   0	  
Chrm	   16	   9	   2	   1	   4	  
La	   15	   9	   5	   0	   1	  
HpMi	   8	   7	   0	   0	   1	  
Total	   	   57	   16	   17	   12	  
Genuine	   48	   32	   10	   1	   5	  
Suspect	   47	   18	   6	   16	   6	  
HpMi	   8	   7	   0	   0	   1	  
percentage	  of	  available	  blocks	  attributed	  to	  that	  cluster	   	  
Genuine	   	   66.7	   20.8	   2.1	   10.4	  
Suspect	   	   31.6	   10.5	   28.1	   10.5	  
HpMi	   	   87.5	   0.0	   0.0	   12.5	  
	  Fig.1:	  Dendrogram	  of	  clusters	  3,	  2,	  and	  4,	  analysis	  of	  500-­‐word	  blocks	  	  And	   perhaps	   one	   more	   analysis	   should	   be	   offered,	   this	   time	   looking	   at	   43	  common	  words	  in	  the	  Apology	  and	  selected	  parts	  of	  the	  Theaetetus	  (B	  =	  143d1-­‐151d6;	  C	  =	  151d7-­‐164b12;	  G	  =	  200d5-­‐end),	  with	   just	   the	  Alcibiades	   dialogues,	  
Hipparchus,	  Erastae,	  and	  Theages:	  	  
	  Fig.	  2:	  Dendrogram	  of	  clusters	  9,	  10,	  2,	  3	  &	  6,	  analysis	  of	  500-­‐word	  blocks	  	  Already	  the	  least	  remarkable	  blocks	  have	  been	  separated	  off,	  including	  all	  20	  of	  
Apology,	   all	  5	  of	  Tht.B,	  3	  of	  Tht.C,	   and	  2	  of	  Tht.G.	  All	   four	  blocks	  of	   the	  Erastae	  have	   also	   been	   separated	   off.	   The	   closely	   related	   clusters	   9	   and	  10	   are	  wholly	  devoted	   to	   the	   remaining	   material	   from	   Theaetetus	   (C	   &	   G),	   a	   dialogue	   that	  shows	  signs	  of	  having	  been	  revised,	  especially	  in	  its	  later	  pages	  where	  there	  are	  affinities	  with	  Sophist.	  Again,	   the	  closely	  related	  material	   in	  clusters	  2,	  3,	  and	  6	  contains	  13	  (of	  20)	  blocks	  of	  the	  Alcibiades	  I,	  5	  (of	  8)	  blocks	  of	  Alcibiades	  II,	  the	  fourth	   and	   final	  block	  of	  Hipparchus,10	   and	   two	  blocks	   (of	  6)	  of	  Theages.	  While	  these	   tests	   can	   only	   demonstrate	   similarities,	   not	   authorship	   or	   date,	   some	  explanation	  needs	  to	  be	  offered	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  parts	  of	  the	  dialogues	  from	  tetralogy	  IV.1	  to	  V.1	  (excluding	  Erastae)	  both	  stand	  out	  from	  most	  of	  the	  corpus	  and	  do	  so	  in	  similar	  ways.	  	  While	  there	  is	  interest	  in	  these	  dubia	  in	  elenchos,	  in	  Socratic	  love,	  in	  searching	  for	  a	  definition,	  and	   in	  Socratic	  education	  more	  broadly,	   I	   see	  no	   interest	   in	  either	  argument	  in	  utramque	  partem	  or	  long-­‐term	  suspension	  of	  judgment.	  They	  focus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10   It should be mentioned that Hipparchus block 1 had been sufficiently anomalous to be allocated its 
own cluster 8, only very loosely attached to clusters 1, 4, 5 & 7. 
largely	  on	  Socrates	   the	  helpful,	   insightful,	   often	   loving	  mentor,	   keen	   to	   employ	  conversation	  so	  as	   to	  discover	  and	  to	  communicate	   the	   truth,	  and	  not	  afraid	   to	  reveal	  what	  he	  believes.	  What	   is	   important	   is	   that	   it	  suggests	  an	   interest	   in	  the	  educational	  potential	  of	  Plato’s	  earlier	  works	  in	  which	  Socrates	  learns	  along	  with	  his	  interlocutors,	  an	  interest	  that	  will	  be	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  background	  of	  Arcesilaus’	  rise	  to	  the	  scholarchate.	  	  	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  it	  was	  as	  Socratic	  as	  I	  am	  suggesting,	  our	  picture	  of	  the	  Academy	  under	  Polemo	  is	  one	  of	  an	  extended	  family	  rather	  than	  of	  a	  doctrine	  factory.	  This	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  appropriate,	  given	  that	  Plato	  himself	  was	  prepared	  to	  modify	  many	  of	  his	  views	   if	  not	  actually	   to	  reverse	   them.	   It	  would	  be	  unthinkable	   that	  Plato’s	  legacy	  should	  have	  already	  become	  a	  fixed	  and	  immutable	  system,	  and	  I	  suspect	   that	  we	  may	  have	   come	   to	   exaggerate	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  Xenocrates’	  legacy	   involved	  the	  systematization	  of	  Plato.	   If	  he	  had	  tried,	  perhaps,	   to	  offer	  a	  schematic	   justification	   of	   the	   physics	   and	   metaphysics	   to	   which	   the	   Academy	  was	  heading	   in	  Plato’s	   later	   years,	   this	  did	  not	  obscure	   the	   fact	   that	   there	  was	  another	  side	  of	  Plato	  to	  be	  explored,	  developed,	  and	   learned	  from.	  In	  short,	  the	  Old	  Academy	  could	  not	  have	  depended	  for	  its	  unity,	  like	  the	  Stoic	  and	  Epicurean	  Schools,	   upon	   any	   commitment	   to	   promote	   and	   build	   upon	   a	   single	   set	   of	  doctrines	  associated	  with	  its	  founder.	  	  	  
Doctrinal	  unity	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  school	  unity	  The	  problem	   for	  Philo	  was	   that	  by	  his	  day	  Hellenistic	   expectations	  of	   a	   School	  were	   imposed	   upon	   the	   Academy.	   The	   portrait	   of	   an	   Academy	   in	   revolt	   being	  promoted	   by	   Antiochus	   and	   Numenius	   was	   anachronistic,	   assuming	   that	   a	  school’s	   identity	   must	   depend	   upon	   loyalty	   to	   basic	   tenets	   of	   its	   founder.	  
Academica	  2.7-­‐9	  offers	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  identity,	  but	  Philo	  had	  to	  do	  more.	  The	  Romans	  wanted	  insights	  into	  the	  great	  era	  of	  innovative	  philosophy,	  and	  into	  the	  most	   respected	   minds.	   Hence	   Cicero	   shows	   that	   they	   wanted	   Zeno,	   not	  Chrysippus;	   Aristotle,	   not	   Theophrastus;	   and	   Plato,	   not	   any	   subsequent	  Academic.	  If	  Philo,	  as	  scholarch,	  were	  to	  reconnect	  the	  Mediterranean	  world	  with	  Plato,	  he	  needed	  to	  claim	  more	  than	  adherence	  to	  a	  Platonic	  spirit	  of	  inquiry.	  And	  if	   being	   a	   legitimate	   successor	   was	   to	   mean	   much,	   he	   had	   also	   to	   claim	   that	  
Arcesilaus,	   Carneades,	   and	   Clitomachus	   were	   legitimate	   parts	   of	   that	   same	  tradition:	   to	   defend	   the	   on-­‐going	   Academic	   tradition	   while	   persuading	   the	  Romans	  that	  Plato	  offered	   important	   lessons	  that	  he	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  place	  before	   them.	   Academica	   1.44-­‐46	   would	   not	   suffice.	   So	   I	   am	   left	   with	   no	   full	  statement	  of	  Philo’s	  position,	  which	  Cicero	  was	  reluctant	  to	  endorse.	  We	  are	  left	  to	   piece	   it	   together	   out	   of	   fragmentary	   evidence,	   and	   to	   require	   that	   it	   must	  accord	  with	  Philo’s	  mature	  epistemology.	  We	  know	  it	  was	  controversial,	  and	  led	  to	  talk	  of	  a	  lie.	  Antiochus	  and	  others	  believed	  that	  Philo	  was	  lying	  not	  about	  Plato	  but	  about	  Plato’s	  recent	  successors	  (Acad.	  II.12):	  	   minus	   enim	   acer	   est	   adversaries	   is	   qui	   ista	   quae	   sunt	   heri	   defensa	   negat	  Academicos	  omnino	  dicere.	  	  That	   means	   that	   the	   One-­‐Academy	   thesis	   of	   Philo	   was	   assimilating	   recent	  Academics	  with	  Plato	  rather	  than	  vice-­‐versa.	  Philo’s	  epistemological	  stance	  was	  that	  things	  were	  not	  non-­‐apprehensible	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  only	  when	  measured	  against	   the	   Stoic	   criterion	   (S.E.	   PH	   1.235).	   And	   if	   they	   were	   not	   non-­‐apprehensible	   then	   an	   Academic	   should	   not	   despair	   of	   apprehending	   some	   of	  them.	  Furthermore,	  if	  they	  did	  apprehend	  them	  they	  should	  surely	  have	  views	  of	  their	   own	   and	   give	   guidance	   where	   required.	   Philo	   needed	   a	   picture	   of	   the	  Academy	  that	  would	  not	  run	  counter	  to	  known	  facts	  about	  recent	  scholarchs,	  but	  one	   that	   would	   not	   represent	   the	   school	   as	   embracing	   ignorance.	   Such	   an	  approach	  would	  divorce	  this	  guidance	  from	  the	  public	  stance	  of	  the	  scholarchs,	  and	   a	   brief	   exchange	  with	   an	   imagined	   Philonian	   opponent	   at	  Academica	  2.60	  gives	   a	   polemical	   hint	   of	   a	   strategy.	   The	   Academics	   are	   asked	  what	   they	   have	  discovered.	  They	  reply	  that	  it	  is	  not	  their	  custom	  to	  reveal	  this.	  This	  draws	  a	  two-­‐fold	  question	   from	  Lucullus:	   ‘What	  are	   these	  mysteries,	  or	  why	  do	  you	  conceal	  your	   view	   (sententiam)	   as	   if	   it	   were	   something	   disreputable?’	   The	   former	  question	  goes	  unanswered,	  the	  latter	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  need	  to	  force	  pupils	  to	  use	  reason	  rather	  than	  authority.	  	  	  
It	   is	   usually	   assumed	   that	   the	   reference	   here	   to	   ‘mysteries’	   is	   a	   malicious	  reference	  to	  secret	  doctrine,11	  such	  that	  the	  Academic	  scholarchs	  could	  not	  have	  had	   if	   one	   accepts	   the	   evidence	   for	   Arcesilaus	   and	   Carneades.	   Yet	   the	   noun	  
sententia	   is	   curiously	   weak	   for	   any	   quasi-­‐religious	   doctrine	   involved	   in	   the	  promulgation	  of	  an	  Academic	  rite.	  The	  term	  ‘mysteries’	  suggests	  above	  all	  arcane	  
practices,	  of	  which	  something	  shown	  or	  taught	  would	  only	  be	  a	  part.12	  	  	  In	  fragment	  21	  of	  the	  Academica	  posteriora	  Augustine	  tells	  us	  that	  Cicero	  said	  the	  Academics	  ‘had	  had	  the	  habit	  of	  concealing	  their	  own	  view	  (again	  sententia),	  and	  not	  revealing	  it	  to	  anybody	  except	  those	  who	  had	  lived	  with	  them	  right	  up	  to	  old	  
age’.	   There	   could	   be	   a	   certain	   truth	   here,	   because	   we	   are	   well	   aware	   that	  Arcesilaus	   was	   brought	   up	   in	   an	   institution	   where	   the	   successor	   did	   live	  constantly	  with	  the	  scholarch	  (D.L.	  4.22).	  Crates	  was	  being	  personally	  groomed	  for	   the	   job	  by	  Polemo,	  with	  whom	  he	   lived	  at	   the	  house	  of	  Lysicles.	  Arcesilaus,	  living	   rather	  with	   Crantor,	  was	   being	   groomed	   rather	   for	   the	   not	   insignificant	  role	  that	  Crantor	  was	  playing,	  a	  different	  role	  from	  that	  of	  the	  scholarch.	  It	  was	  not	  planned	  that	  Arcesilaus	  should	  take	  on	  the	   latter	  role,	  since	  Socratides	  was	  earmarked	   as	   Crates’	   successor	   (D.L.	   4.32);	   Crates,	  whose	   tenure	   of	   office	  was	  very	   brief,	   had	   not	   groomed	   Socratides	   for	   long	   enough.	   If	   only	   we	   listen	   the	  sources	  tell	  us	  which	  job	  Arcesilaus	  was	  groomed	  for	  and	  for	  a	  while	  held:	  it	  was	  keeper	   of	   Plato’s	   books:	   oJ kekthmevno" ta; bibliva	   (D.L.	   4.33),	  who	  would	   charge	  those	   wanting	   to	   read	   through	   the	   newly	   edited	   corpus	   (D.L.	   3.66).	   And	  presumably	  the	  editing	  had	  itself	  been	  undertaken	  by	  whoever	  held	  that	  office.	  	  	  I	  believe	  that	  we	  can	  easily	  name	  the	  first	  holder.	  Philip	  of	  Opus	  is	  credited	  with	  having	  prepared	  the	  Laws	  for	  publication	  after	  Plato	  had	  left	  them	  ‘malleable’,13	  i.e.	   in	   an	   uncorrected	   and	   disorganised	   state	   (ajdiorqwvtou" ... kai; 
sugkekucumevnou"),	  since	  the	  dying	  Plato	  had	  not	  found	  time	  to	  put	  them	  together	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Secret rites may be suspected of acting as a cover for base practices, as often in the Roman world. 
12 This should be obvious if one compares Theon of Smyrna’s detailed depiction of philosophy as a 
sacred rite at Intr. 12-14. It is indeed the case that teaching will there be associated with the second of 
five stages, but rites involve preparatory stages, a stage of fulfilment, and further mechanisms by which 
those who have made the journey may hand the rite on to others. ‘Mysteries’ would primarily involve 
an Academic way of perpetuating the school’s heritage, a way that was hidden from the ordinary 
observer. 
13  My translation of the phrase ‘in wax’ (ejn khrw'/, D.L. 3.37), 
(pro;" to; sunqei'nai aujtouv",	  anon.	  Proleg.	  24.13-­‐16).14	  Philip’s	  role	  regarding	  Laws	  is	   in	   fact	  perfectly	   captured	  by	   the	   term	  ajnagrafeuv" applied	   to	   a	   figure	  usually	  held	   to	   be	   Philip	   in	   the	   Philodeman	   Index	   Academicorum	   (III.36).	   It	   is	   widely	  forgotten	  that	  this	  and	  the	  verb	  ajnagravfw are	  primarily	  legal	  terms,	  applying	  to	  the	  making	  of	  official	  records	  or	  the	  promulgation	  of	  laws.15	  Assuming	  that	  Philip	  himself	  wrote	  the	  Epinomis,	  as	  ancient	  tradition	  usually	  claimed,	  my	  methods	  of	  computational	   stylistics	   would	   make	   Philip	   rather	   than	   Plato	   primarily	  responsible	   for	   the	   working	   vocabulary	   of	   the	   books	   with	   most	   legislation	   in	  them.	  It	  was	  at	  first	  thought	  that	  there	  were	  three	  hands	  in	  the	  Laws,	  but	  careful	  separation	   of	   the	   technical	   language	   of	   legislation	   in	   books	   IV-­‐VI	   and	   VIII-­‐IX	  proved	  that	  it	  was	  the	  dominance	  of	  such	  language	  that	  accounted	  for	  the	  bizarre	  results	  that	  some	  portions	  of	  the	  later	  books	  (and	  all	  of	  XI)	  were	  yielding.	  Cluster	  analysis,	   again	   using	   Ward’s	   method	   and	   standardised	   data	   (97	   variables)16	  produced	  the	  following	  results:	  	  
 
Book No. of blocks Plato cluster Epinomis cluster Legal cluster 
I 4 1, 3, 4 2  
II 4 1, 2, 3   
III 4 1, 2, 3, 4   
IV* 3 1, 2, 3   
V* 3  1, 2, 3  
VI* 5  1, 2, 3, 4, 5  
4-6 legal 1   1 
VII 6 1, 3, 4, 6 2, 5  
VIII* 3 2 1, 3  
IX* 5 1 2, 3  
8-9legal 2   1, 2 
X 5 1, 2, 3 Myth and ending  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  The general thrust of 24.13-16 is supported by the quotation from Proclus at 25.6-7; earlier evidence 
is found in Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 370f. 
15  Plato uses the verb six times in the Laws, in the very books where legislation is most concentrated 
(VI 784c, d, e; VIII 850a; XI 917e; XII 947b), chiefly in the former sense, but otherwise only at Grg. 
506c (‘enlist’) and Meno 83b (‘draw’). 
16  As used for analysis across the Platonic corpus; however, by late works a very few of these words 
have dropped out of the commonest 300, and therefore no longer qualified as common vocabulary. 
XI 4   1, 2, 3, 4 
XII 4 4 2 1, 3 Table	  2:	  cluster	  distribution	  of	  blocks	  of	  Laws	  and	  Epinomis	  *	  Books	  IV-­‐VI,	  VIII	  and	  IX	  exclude	  legislative	  material	  placed	  in	  ‘legal’	  files	  
 
	  Fig.	  3:	  Dendrogram	  of	  clusters,	  Laws	  and	  Epinomis	  	  By	   comparison	  with	  works	   such	   as	   the	  Sophist,	  Statesman,	   and	  Philebus	   it	  was	  established	   that	   what	   I	   mark	   as	   the	   ‘Plato	   cluster’	   is	   plausibly	   close	   to	   the	  vocabulary	  of	  late	  Plato	  more	  generally.17	  My	  assumption	  is	  that	  where	  the	  style	  closely	  resembles	  the	  Epinomis,	  then	  Philip	  has	  had	  an	  important	  role	  in	  writing	  the	  material	  up,	  even	  though	  Plato	  may	  ordinarily	  have	  exercised	  final	  editorial	  control.	  Plato	  would	  then	  turn	  out	  to	  have	  personally	  written	  up	  the	  parts	  closest	  to	   his	   main	   interests	   (most	   of	   I-­‐IV,	   much	   of	   VII	   on	   education,	   most	   of	   X	   on	  theology,	  and	  the	  end	  of	  XII	  on	  the	  Nocturnal	  Council),	  entrusting	  the	  writing-­‐up	  of	  matters	  of	  practical	  legislation	  to	  Philip.	  	  This	  agrees	  well	  with	  the	  description	  of	  Philip	  as	  Plato’s	  ajnagrafeuv",	  a	  word	  I	  translate	  as	  ‘promulgator’.	  Our	  picture	  of	  a	  work	   to	  which	   two	  hands	   contribute	  also	   largely	  agrees	  with	   the	  notion	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  I exclude the bulk of the Timaeus-Critias which has been shown to be written in a distinctly 
different voice or register associated with myth: see H. Tarrant, E.E. Benitez, and T. Roberts, ‘The 
Mythical Voice in the Timaeus-Critias: Stylometric Indicators’, Ancient Philosophy 31 (2011), 95-120. 
Plato	  never	  found	  time	  to	  organise	  it	  personally,	  and	  that	  Philip	  had	  to	  provide	  both	  editing	  and	  structure.	  	  A	  perennial	  puzzle	  concerning	  Philip	  is	  why	  he	  should	  have	  been	  described	  as	  a	  Platonic	   ‘successor’	   (diavdoco" tou' Platwnikou' didaskaleivou)	   in	   the	   anonymous	  
Prolegomena	  (24.18).	  Could	  it	  perhaps	  be	  that	  this	  is	  not	  an	  erroneous	  reference	  to	   his	   having	   become	   ‘scholarch’	   of	   the	   ‘Academy’	   (words	   that	   are	   not	   in	   fact	  used),	   but	   a	   recognition	   that	   it	   was	   he	   who	   took	   over	   representing	   the	   now	  absent	   Plato?	   Philip	   had	   a	   role	   in	   assisting	   to	   promote	   the	   work	   of	   Plato	   by	  organising	  his	  latest	  endeavours,	  in	  offering	  some	  interpretative	  thoughts	  in	  the	  
Epinomis,	   and	   more	   generally	   in	   explaining	   Plato	   (perhaps	   in	   an	   orientalising	  fashion)	   and	   supplementing	   his	   biography.18	   Ultimately	   it	   is	   this	   kind	   of	   work	  that	  kept	  Platonism	  alive	   in	  antiquity.	  Activity	   centred	  as	   it	   is	  on	  Plato	  and	  his	  works	   is	   only	   thinly	   attested	   in	   the	   more	   substantial	   remains	   of	   the	   early	  scholarchs:	  Speusippus,	  Xenocrates,	  and	  Polemo.	  An	  Encomium	  of	  Plato	  in	  the	  list	  of	   Speusippus’	  works	   (D.L.	   4.4-­‐5)	   scarcely	   amounts	   to	   Platonic	   exegesis,	  while	  Xenocrates’	  basic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  psychogony	  in	  the	  Timaeus	  (Mor.	  1012d-­‐13b	  =	   fr.	   188	   I-­‐P)	  probably	   reached	  Plutarch	  via	  Crantor’s	   commentary,	  which	  Proclus	  declares	  to	  have	  been	  the	  first	  (in	  Tim.	  1.76.1).	  There	  is	  no	  work	  devoted	  to	   Plato	   in	   Diogenes’	   list	   (D.L.	   4.11-­‐14),	   though	  works	   devoted	   to	   Parmenides	  and	   the	   Pythagoreans	   do	   appear	   there.	   And	   Aristotle	   (de	   Caelo	   I.9	   279b32	   =	  Xenocrates	   fr.	   153	   I-­‐P)	   and	   his	   scholiasts	   (frr.	   155-­‐7	   I-­‐P)	   make	   it	   plain	   that	  though	   Xenocrates	   and	   Speusippus	   maintained	   that	   the	   creation	   motif	   in	   the	  
Timaeus	  was	  an	  expository	  device,	  they	  did	  so	  in	  the	  course	  of	  defending	  Plato	  in	  inter-­‐school	  debate	  and	  rivalry,	  an	  activity	  that	  obviously	  suited	  the	  scholarch.	  	  	  Though	  only	  nine	  fragments	  survive,	  we	  do	  find	  Hermodorus	  writing	  a	  book	  On	  
Plato	   (frr.	   7-­‐8	   I-­‐P,	   cf.	   frr.	   4-­‐5),	   which	   was	   exegetical	   in	   nature,	   explaining	   the	  ‘Platonic’	   theory	  of	  matter	   in	  detail	  and	  apparently	  with	  an	  eye	  on	  the	  Philebus	  (frr.	  7-­‐8).	  He	  is	  also	  associated	  with	  the	  dissemination	  of	  Platonic	  logoi	  (frr.	  1,	  3),	  which	  Cicero	  identifies	  with	  Plato’s	  books	  (fr.	  2).	  The	  precise	  activities	  that	  led	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  See Philip Horky, ‘Persian Cosmos and Greek Philosophy: Plato’s Associates and the Zoroastrian 
Magoi’, OSAP 37 (2009), 47-103, especially 48-9, 94-7. A work on Plato is postulated by the Suda. 
the	   saying	   lovgoisin JErmovdwro" are	   not	   recoverable,	   but	   somehow	  Hermodorus	  was	  trading	  in	  Plato.	  Perhaps	  Hermodorus	  continued	  Philip’s	  editorial	  activities,	  since	  it	  is	  after	  the	  first	  e[kdosi" of	  Plato’s	  works	  that	  the	  ‘possessors	  of	  the	  books’	  are	  reported	  to	  have	  charged	  fees	  to	  those	  wanting	  a	  complete	  reading	  of	  part	  of	  the	   corpus.19	   And	   interestingly	   Hermodorus	   shared	   Philip’s	   mathematical	  interests	  and	  his	  interest	  in	  Zoroastrianism.	  Might	  there	  be	  a	  connection?	  	  The	  next	  figure	  to	  work	  on	  Plato’s	  oeuvre	  was	  Crantor,	  as	  the	  first	  to	  be	  called	  his	  ‘exegete’	  by	  Proclus.	  Certainly	  he	  is	  known	  to	  have	  had	  views	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Atlantis	  story,	  as	  well	  as	  various	  aspects	  of	  psychogony	  of	  the	  Timaeus.	  He	  may	  also	   have	   expressed	   views	   about	   the	   range	   of	   functions	   that	   a	   dialogue’s	  prooemion	  may	  have,	  and	  I	  suspect	  that	  he	  did	  so	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Theaetetus.20	  Arcesilaus	   was	   his	   great	   friend,	   sharing	   his	   house	   (D.L.	   4.22),	   according	   to	  tradition	  as	  his	   junior	  partner	   (ejrwvmeno").	  He	   seems	   to	  have	  worked	   further	  on	  writings	   begun	   by	   Crantor	   (D.L.	   4.24,	   32),	   and	   inherited	   his	   fortune	   (4.25).	  Whatever	   else	   happened,	   he	   ‘had	   come	   into	   the	   possession	   of	   Plato’s	   books’	  (4.32),	  probably	  as	  a	  young	  man,21	  and	  in	  my	  view	  at	  the	  death	  of	  Crantor	  around	  290B.C.	  Though	  I	  read	  a	  lot	   into	  this	   information,	  no	  such	  statements	  are	  made	  regarding	  the	  scholarchs,	  and	  the	   ‘possessors’	  are	  should	  not	  be	  identified	  with	  the	  scholarchs	  at	  D.L.	  3.66	  (from	  Antigonus	  of	  Carystus’	  Life	  of	  Zeno).	  	  	  It	   may	   be	   thought	   that	   all	   necessary	   organisation	   of	   the	   Platonic	   Corpus,	   as	  undertaken	  with	  regard	  to	  about	  one	  quarter	  of	  it	  by	  Philip,	  was	  completed	  long	  before	  Crantor	  arrived	  on	  the	  scene.	  However,	  my	  impression	  is	  that	  even	  Plato’s	  complete	  writings	  had	  been	  left	  in	  need	  of	  organisational	  work,	  not	  least	  because	  some	  had	  been	   left	   neglected	  while	   others	   existed	   in	   alternative	   versions.22	  An	  ‘authorised	   version’	   was	   required,	   which	   may	   well	   have	   left	   some	   authentic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  I believe that the corpus was at this time published in four groups of twelve books, with the Laws 
counting as twelve, and the Republic with Timaeus-Critias with another twelve. 
20  See H. Tarrant, ‘L’importance du Théétète d’avant Thrasylle’, in D. el Murr (ed), Etudes sur le 
Théétète de Platon (Tradition de la pensée classique), Paris: J. Vrin, forthcoming. 
21  This relies on a a very probable supplement at the equivalent point in Philodemus’ account.*** 
22  See my ‘The Origins and Shape of Plato’s Six-Book Republic’, Antichthon, 46 (2012), 52-78, for 
Republic and (less worryingly) Gorgias; see David Sedley, Plato’s Cratylus, Cambridge 2003, 6-16, 
for Cratylus; see anon. in Tht. III, 28-37 and H. Tarrant, ‘The Theaetetus as a Narrative Dialogue?’, in 
N. O’Sullivan (ed.) ASCS 31 Proceedings, 2010: classics.uwa.edu.au/ascs31. 
material	   from	  discarded	  versions	  outside	   the	   final	   corpus.	  Any	  difficulties	  with	  the	  high-­‐profile	  works	  would	  have	  been	  fixed	  first.	  Lower-­‐profile	  dialogues	  of	  a	  broadly	  ‘Socratic’	  character	  would	  have	  been	  left	  until	  last,	  but	  once	  their	  serious	  study	   began	   a	   new	   consciousness	   of	   the	   Socratic	   legacy	   would	   have	   emerged	  among	   those	  most	   concerned	  with	   the	   public	   profile	   of	   the	   corpus,	   Arcesilaus	  among	   them.	   Dialogues	   like	   Charmides,	   Lysis,	   Euthydemus,23	   Protagoras,	   and	  
Meno	   employed	   tactics,	   including	   argument	   pro	   and	   contra,	   which	   could	  contribute	  to	  the	  Academic	  armoury.	  It	  was	  not	  contrary	  to	  Academic	  heritage	  to	  employ	  them.	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  provision	  was	  made	  for	  any	  role	  inherited	  from	  Crantor	  when	  Arcesilaus	   became	   scholarch,	   but	   we	   are	   told	   that,	   after	   Arcesilaus,	   Lacydes	  handed	  the	  School	  down	  during	  his	  own	   life-­‐time	  to	  Telecles	  and	  Evander,	  and	  this	  may	  be	  further	  evidence	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  double	  tradition	  either	  persisting,	  or	   being	   re-­‐establised	   after	   Arcesilaus’	   joint	   tenure.	   At	   any	   rate	   it	   was	   only	  Evander	  who	  handed	  down	  the	  scholarch’s	  position	  to	  Hegesinus,	  from	  whom	  it	  passed	  to	  Carneades.	  Carneades	  himself	  seems	  to	  have	  groomed	  Clitomachus	  for	  the	  job	  (D.L.	  4.67).	  As	  we	  draw	  closer	  to	  Cicero’s	  time	  there	  continued	  to	  be	  some	  voice	  in	  the	  school	  to	  rival	  that	  of	  the	  scholarch,	  Metrodorus	  of	  Stratonicea	  being	  sometimes	  opposed	  to	  Clitomachus.	  	  	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  largely	  to	  such	  a	  division	  of	  public	  and	  Platonic	  roles	  that	  Philo	  had	   appealed	   in	   his	   One	   Academy	   thesis.	   It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   Plato	   and	  argument	  in	  utramque	  partem	  had	  always	  existed	  side	  by	  side	  in	  the	  Academy.	  If	  Arcesilaus	  took	  this	  cautious	  approach	  somewhat	   further	  and	  refused	  to	  reveal	  his	   own	   hand	   as	   scholarch	   at	   all,	   that	  was	   understandable,	   and	   the	   tactic	   had	  good	  Socratic	  precedents.	  One	  can	  imagine	  that	  in	  old	  age	  he	  might	  have	  dropped	  his	  guard	  and	  at	  least	  let	  his	  successor	  know	  of	  how	  he	  had	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  division	  of	  roles	  and	  even,	  to	  some	  degree,	  where	  he	  really	  stood	  on	  the	  key	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  The first three are appealed to by Academic argument regarding Plato’s inclination to suspension of 
judgment at anon. Proleg. 10.16-20; Neoplatonists insisted that the ultimate aim of such opposite 
arguments was the truth (ibid. 10.22), and the tactic is used by Hermeias in Phdr. 9.19-20 (pro;" 
eu{resin kai; bavsanon th'" ajlhqeiva"). The position of Philo of Larissa was not dissimilar to judge from 
Cic. Acad. II.7, II.60. 
issues.	  The	  division	  between	  the	  public	  spokesman	  and	  Platonic	  teacher	  was	  still	  alive	  in	  Philo’s	  day,	  when	  Charmadas	  had	  certainly	  been	  teaching	  Plato’s	  Gorgias	  even	  though	  Philo	  is	  not	  known	  to	  have	  promoted	  Plato	  in	  any	  special	  way.	  The	  two	  are	  sometimes	  mentioned	  together	  as	  if	  they	  constituted	  the	  joint	  leadership	  of	   the	   Fourth	   Academy	   (Sextus	   PH1.222	   =	   T	   v,	   Eus.	   PE14.4	   =	   T	   vii).	  With	   the	  break-­‐up	   of	   the	   School	   Philo	   no	   longer	   needed	   to	   keep	   the	   Academy’s	   long-­‐standing	   arrangements,	   as	   he	   understood	   them,	   secret.	   So	   at	   Rome	   he	   finally	  explained.	   Antiochus,	   who	   had	   not	   loyally	   followed	   Philo	   long	   enough,	   never	  heard	   this	   before.	   Perhaps	   this	   reflected	   a	   decision	   on	   Philo’s	   part	   to	   avoid	  adopting	  Antiochus	  as	  his	  successor.	  Antiochus	  did	  not	   like	  what	  he	  heard,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  was	  wrong.	  Appeals	  to	  a	  secret	  tradition	  were	  always	  hard	  either	  to	  refute	  or	  to	  substantiate.	  In	  the	  tough	  world	  of	  Roman	  educational	  politics	  one	  believed	  them	  only	  if	  it	  suited	  one.	  	  	  Believing	   in	   such	   a	   tradition	   has	   suited	   virtually	   nobody	   in	  modern	   times,	   but	  that	  is	  partly	  because	  it	   is	  seen	  as	  concerning	  esoteric	  dogmatism.	  Nobody	  ever	  made	   such	   a	   claim,	   only	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   public	   face	   of	   the	   Academy,	   as	  projected	  beyond	   its	  walls	  by	  the	  scholarch,	  did	  not	  reveal	   the	   full	  extent	  of	   its	  internal	  practices	  and	  of	  its	  commitment	  to	  what	  it	  saw	  as	  Plato’s	  heritage.	  The	  heritage	  did	  not	  consist	  of	  Transcendent	  Forms,	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Good,	  a	  God	  who	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  a	  ‘creator’,	  and	  a	  world-­‐soul	  arranged	  according	  to	  principles	  of	  harmony.	  Its	  central	  commitment	  was	  to	  on-­‐going	  inquiry,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  getting	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  truth,	  but	  with	  a	  commitment	  to	  constantly	  revisiting	  any	  conclusions	  that	  one	  had	  reached.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
